
STATEMENT

Name: Address: Occupation:		Mr Ted Richards	
		C/O Victoria Police, 313 Spencer Street, Melbourne	
		of Police	
STA	TES:		
1.	I make this statement, in response to the Commission's 'notice to produce' given under the <i>Inquiries Act</i> 2014.		
Pers	onal Inf	ormation	
2.	I graduated from the Victoria Police Academy in 1988 and performed in a number roles at the rank of Constable. These included uniform and plain clothes duties in metropolitan Melbourne and outer Suburbs. I promoted to Senior Constable and performed general duties policing in the Central Business District.		
3.	In 1996 I transferred to the Victoria Police as a		
4.	In 1999	I transferred to the Unit.	
5.	In 2001	I performed duties at the	
6.	In 2002	I was promoted to a uniform position in the	
7.	In 2002	2 I transferred to the as a	
8.	On Unit) as	2006 I transferred to the Dedicated Source Unit (Source Development s a	
9.	In 2009 Unit.	I was promoted to at the Source Development	
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Use of Ms Gobbo as a Human Source

- My only dealings with Ms Gobbo stem from my position at the Source Development Unit (SDU) between March 2006 through to 2012.
- 16. In this time I became aware of the identity of Ms Gobbo through internal SDU meetings, and when required as the acting controller in the absence of the allocated controller. The meetings were the regular risk assessments carried out on each human source under registration or pending recruitment. All members of the SDU were privy to this information. The information contained in these meetings was documented. Information I received as the Acting Controller was recorded in my official diary. I did not disseminate any information in relation to information received from the handlers of Ms Gobbo.
- 17. In my role as a controller at the SDU, I debriefed the handlers post contact with the human source, approved the relevant Informer Contact Reports and the corresponding Information reports where submitted.
- 18. The chain of command and Human Source registration process ensured that the oversight of the management of Ms Gobbo as a Human Source was carried out by the Human Source Management Unit and the appropriate Local Source Registrar and the Central Source Registrar. This framework of authorisation and use of human sources was following the Standard Operating Procedures developed by the HSMU and SDU.

- 19. The members having input into the tasking and deployment of Ms Gobbo included the SDU team headed by an Inspector and overseen by a Superintendent. The HSMU structure had full authority to activate, deactivate or direct tasking.
- 20. The utilisation of the sterile process provided the required separation between those receiving the information and the ability of the SDU to manage the human sources. This protocol was developed using best practice from a global perspective around the management of high risk human sources.
- 21. This oversight body and members of the chain of Command had the full access, documentation and input into the authorisation and continued authorisation of Ms Gobbo as a Human Source.
- 22. In early 2012 I was allocated as the caretaker of the phone attributed to Ms Gobbo whilst she was undertaking a witness protection risk assessment phase.
- 23. During this caretaker mode, I had cause to speak with Ms Gobbo on six (6) separate occasions. This caretaker mode was documented by Inspector O'Connor with rules of engagement which included no tasking. The information from these conversations was recorded by me in my SDU electronic diary. Any intelligence that may have been relevant to current or ongoing crimes was documented in the relevant Information Report.
- 24. The conversations related to general well being, advice sought in respect of next steps as a witness and to provide any assistance where possible. I briefed the relevant Inspector on each occasion (Inspector O'Connor and Inspector Allison). Each of these occasions were on the phone and I never met Ms Gobbo.
- 25. During this time Ms Gobbo was not a registered human source.
- 26. Up to the end of 2012 I was aware that the SDU had created a list of people who may have known the identity of Ms Gobbo when acting as a Human Source. I was aware that the handlers of Ms Gobbo compiled this list. The list remained saved within the SDU electronic storage.

Concerns in relation to the use of Ms Gobbo as a Human Source

- 27. As was best practice at the SDU, the ongoing risk assessment of Ms Gobbo being used as a Human Source provided an environment to challenge the concept of her use as a human source.
- 28. This practice was not selective and every human source and potential human source was constantly risk assessed, taking into consideration the 5 key risk areas as per the HSMU documentation. This practice was well established and provided the framework in order to update all members of the SDU and also to provide relevant information to the HSMU and authorising chain of command.
- 29. This environment ensured robust discussions could take place without fear of retribution and ensured the honesty of the opinions could be retained. Whilst hypotheticals were often used to assess risk, it was paramount for a logical and considered conclusion be reached.
- 30. The fact that Ms Gobbo was a lawyer, ensured that we challenged each other's awareness of her obligations to her clients, what was deemed to be legal professional privilege, what was seen as a conflict of interest, what was seen as the greater good for the community and the victims of crime. The issue of perception was a constant among discussions, in that the public or those with no understanding of how Ms Gobbo was being tasked or how information was passed on or acted upon could be a negative if her identity was compromised. Whilst she was a registered human source, we were confident her identity would not be exposed.
- 31. The ability to ensure that the identity of all human sources remains confidential is paramount to the safety of the human source, their friends and family and for the confidence of the community to come forward with information and not be exposed for the provision of such information.
- 32. The assessments guided the tasking of Ms Gobbo in relation ensuring that she was not being tasked against people that she was representing in an official legal capacity.
- 33. The conclusion reached post risk assessment of ongoing use, tactical deployment or witness deployment was not a decision for the Source Development Unit, as this decision-making process could only be approved through the chain of command.

- 34. Superintendent Porter, at the time of the SDU handling Ms Gobbo as a human source, was responsible as the Central Source Registrar and as such had full authority to ensure Ms Gobbo remained as a Human source, what tasking was approved and when to deactivate or ask for further information to guide his decisions.
- 35. Mr Porter and the HSMU had full access to all records of Ms Gobbo during this time. Mr Porter represented Victoria Police and had the overall authority to make decisions based on recommendations of the SDU or other interested parties

Other relevant matters

- 36. I have not been involved in any matters relevant to Mr Cvetanovski.
- 37. I have not been involved with any other human sources that have provided information to police and who are subject to legal obligations.
- I have successfully complete Detective Training School and Advanced Investigator Training. These course and basic training have provided me with a comprehensive understanding of a persons right to silence and to speak to a legal representative. I have a firm understanding of Public Interest Immunity due to the giving of evidence at a range of court proceedings whereby I could not divulge methodology of covert investigations reveal the identity of human sources or where I have previously given evidence utilising an or police I have no professional training in respect of legal professional privilege.

39. I do not have any other matters relevant to the Commission's terms of reference that I can provide assistance with.

Ted Richards