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# **ISSUE COVER SHEET**


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#### Issue:

Dedicated Source Unit – audit conducted of human source 21803838 records.

## **Background:**

As requested by Commander Moloney, on Thursday 27 April 2006, I attended at the premises of the Dedicated Source Unit (DSU) & conducted an audit of the records for human source 21803838 (hereafter referred to as the source).



### **Process adopted**

In order to conduct this audit, I have referred to Force Policy (CCI 3/05), discussed the source with the controller & handlers, & inspected records on hand at the DSU in relation to this matter.

I have also had the opportunity to observe & & & & interact with the source in an operational setting over the last weekend. I am aware that the members maintain extensive diary notes as well as documented contact/information reports.

## **Force Policy**

Force Policy on these issues is contained within CCI 3/05. A minor breach of Force Policy may have been detected, not associated with the DSU.

Handlers are required to submit information/contact reports regarding the relationship, including a quarterly assessment as to status (active, inactive, unsuitable). It is clear these reports are being submitted by the handlers. Since registration on 16 September 2005, there have been 147 recorded contacts with the source. The last contact report perused was 021 which dated from 03/03/06 to 09/03/06, there are a number subsequent to this that require checking before filing. The source had contact with

The source was introduced to the DSU by the MDID, after contact with investigators on 07 September 2005.

The controller is required to actively supervise the relationship & manage the informer management file. It is clear the controller is actively managing the file, & has been attending meetings with the handlers & source as necessary.

The status of the source has been reviewed on 30/10/05, 28/11/05, 09/01/06, 14/02/06, & 27/03/06 & written risk assessments were updated.



The local informer registrar is required to maintain the informer management file & oversight the relationship. There is no written evidence that the local informer registrar has conducted the two quarterly inspections/reviews as required by policy, but may have done without documenting.

#### **Risk Assessment**

It is clear within the file that the handlers & controller have been mindful of the risks associated with

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this human source. These considerations are regularly considered in documentation perused & the risk assessment documentation has been updated as required.

It is clear the risk associated with the source continues to remain high, but the risk is being managed at an appropriate level by the right people with the necessary training & attributes.

#### **Observations**

Upon perusal of the files, it is unclear as to the true motive of the source in cooperating with police. Whilst health issues are identified (& may be the true motive), any real motive appears unclear, but it is clear the source has a dislike for certain persons who are involved in high level criminal behaviour.

The relationship between the handlers & the source is a full time role, it is clear that the handlers have to be rotated to keep them fresh & to maintain objectivity. This is occurring at regular intervals.

The relationship between the source & Victoria Police is changing, the initial purpose for assisting police has been achieved, further deployment of the source will need to be carefully planned.

The source has a high personal profile both within their chosen industry & the media, this is a potential risk to the source & Victoria Police.

Deployment required may be of a non operation nature.

The accurate number of police that aware of the identity of the source is not known, but it is clear it is many. Upon reading the file it is clear that at least 2 teams & management from the MDID, Task Force Purana staff, ACC staff, State Intelligence Division staff & Management, Ethical Standards Department, State Surveillance Unit & Undercover Unit who either know the identity, or could give an "educated" guess as to the true identity. It is also clear that the Informer Management Unit (Human Source Management Unit) are all aware of the identity, it is questionable that all need to know. This knowledge is a risk & should be considered before any further deployment.

The source also has association with/or a relationship with a number of ex police, namely David Waters, Paul Dale, Mark Tully & current member Richard Shields. All are well known to ESD as having inappropriate or corrupt relationships. There is also mention of jailed former member Malcolm Rosenes, any involvement in these relationships need to be considered & managed.

It is clear this source is being managed & will need to remain to be managed in accordance with Policy. The source has identified aspects of alleged police corruption.

The source also frequents the same areas as ex member Brian Murphy, who acts as a private investigator/negotiator to criminals, this also is a potential risk.

The source also has a number of relationships with members of the same industry, intelligence on hand would suggest these relationships could be problematical for the source.

#### **Continued deployment**

I am satisfied that the source is a valuable asset to Victoria Police. I consider Victoria Police should continue with the relationship & the DSU should be the one contact point with the source.

The source continues to provide excellent information & has led to successful outcomes. The lifestyle of the source continues to be an issue for the DSU, it draws attention to the source.

of the source need to continue. Security levels regarding

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access need to be checked to ensure that appropriate security protocols are in place.

Information provided to date, needs to be verified against information gleaned through traditional investigations, this is a role for the DSU analyst.

## Comment:

It is clear the source can only be managed by the DSU. If the DSU were not managing this source, then in my view, the risks are too high for non trained police to perform.

The source is only providing Victoria based information, there is no interstate information provided & it is doubtful there will be.

## Recommendation:

For information, attention & transmission to the DSU for filing please.

A. M. Biggin Superintendent Covert Support Division Intelligence & Covert Support Department (9865 2129)

Date: 28 April 2006

## **Distribution & Authority List:**

1. Superintendent Porter / / 2006
OIC DSU / / 2006