

Sandy White-O

### initial considerations re the Comrie report – 27/033/19

Page 7 para 3

Reference to 2010 CMRD review and finding of supervisory shortcomings. What were they?

‘An overview of the human source registration’ Comment that *sources would not be registered until AOR and full risk assessment completed* is incorrect. This was NOT the case when 3838 was registered and it was common for sources to be registered prior to these documents being completed. In fact the risk assessment would usually take several weeks to complete properly and required several meetings with sources who would also be providing intelligence during these meetings.

As an example: Sources would be [redacted] by [redacted] to [redacted] or [redacted] simple things like [redacted] or [redacted] prior to formal registration. Their ability to be [redacted] these [redacted] factored into the actual risk assessment.

Page 9 para 5

Reference to Source Management Log suggests this was to be completed as part of policy. This was not policy at that time and was a practice introduced by <sup>Sandy White-O</sup> only for the SDU. Comrie seems to confuse the Source management file held by Interpose with the SML held within the SDU.

Page 10, para 3

Controllers log is actually the source management log. Description of this *document as local and ad hoc* are incorrect. This document was very important and used to bring a new controller up to speed if there was a change in controllers. The SML was always ultimately saved onto the interpose system so that the centralised base had a copy of every document, recording or otherwise in relation to a particular source.

Page 11 para 2

*The interpose file presented as a document that had been shuffled, scanned and then loaded into interpose.* I have no idea what he was looking at. The ICR's were always sequentially numbered.

Page 11 para 5

References to ICR's being out of sequence in the interpose file. This was not uncommon as when handlers were changed, the new handler may have more time to push the paperwork through quickly whilst the previous handler had fallen behind in submitting the reports instantly. This was why handlers were changed, they could not keep up with the record keeping process which was essential but very onerous. It should also be borne in mind that

all the handlers were managing multiple sources simultaneously so workload had a lot to do with the timely submission of ICRs.

Page 14 para 2

*Review of ICR content makes it clear that discussions were not restricted to such matters (not clients) Absolutely wrong! How many ICRS did they check?*

***'And even information about the where points of vulnerability may lie for prosecutors'.  
LIE***

Page 14, para 4

***ICR 15/06/07 How can I represent him and charge money for services when I am talking to the police and I am largely responsible for him being where he is*** I don't believe we took any information from her re Tony Mokbel and she certainly did not contribute to his arrest or charging.

Page 15 para 4

A summary of legal professional privilege and how it could affect a human source who is a lawyer. Where did this come from? It is not footnoted or sourced.

Page 16 para 6

***In the absence of any apparent active discouragement from police handlers...*** WRONG

**Same paragraph – *'handlers have passed on such information'*** WRONG

Page 18 para 2

Breach of confidentiality notices. I cannot comment on this until I see the records and the listen to the recordings.

Page 20 para 1

SDU concerns re integrity of HSMU system. Comment that nothing was done to alleviate fears. WRONG – the file was moved from the HSMU to Supt Thomas control.

Page 22, para 5

Comments on risk assessment that seem to acknowledge that the source wanted to inform on clients. I have to read the risk assessments to comment on this.

Page 26 para 6

Quote from SDU SOP's (which I wrote) concerning integrity and ethics of source handlers behaviour. Comrie goes on to elaborate and then suggests we intentionally hid information from risk assessments in order to be allowed to continue managing source. His comments are in direct contravention of the SOP's he had himself quoted. No evidence of his suggestion exists, this is a deliberate exaggeration designed to discredit the SDU members.  
Page 30 para

Comments about the 2010 CMRD review concerning the fact that most members were not completing quality risk assessments. The risk assessment process was designed by <sup>Sandy White-O</sup> and Owen and was a work in progress.

Page 38 para 2

**Statement that nothing was done in response to 3838 comments about her mental and physical health. Suggestion that she should have received psychological help and that she did not. TOTALLY UNTRUE – she was sent to two different psychs at the direction of the SDU.**

Page 42 Para

Comments surrounding the use of multiple handlers are niaive. Resourcing issues make it impossible not to use multiple handlers for a long term source.

Page 43 para 6

Comment re serious discrepancies between ICRs and SML???? What is he talking about?

Page 46 para 2

**Quote – 'source advised that police cannot be involved in undermining a persons defence' Clear evidence of a course of conduct by source handlers showing there recognition of the LPP barrier and a desire not to impact on a persons defence strategy.**

**Comrie provides the above quote DESPITE saying he believed handlers actively sought out defence strategies in order to improve prosecutions. Comrie then refers to an ICR stating the information was passed on to investigators and that this was probably a solicitor client relationship. Was It?**

**Page 51 para 1**

Comments in CMRD report relate to organisational handling of source, not just SDU

**Page 55 para 3**

Source being used by Petra to work against Andrew Hodson. Nothing to do with SDU

## Page 59 para 2

Statement that SDU did nothing to prepare the Petra handlers for management of 3838. WRONG. There was a plan for management of the source which included detailing two experienced members who were [REDACTED] (the [REDACTED] of human source training), as well as extensive briefings with the Petra team as to how best manage that source.

## Page 59 para

**Reference to fact that the SDU should have engaged the source with Witsec two years prior to it happening. This was not viable and the source did not need Witsec two years earlier. Comrie would have been told this if he ever bothered to ask**

## Overall comment

Prior to the SDU there was no requirement for ICR's to be prepared which documented a police officer/human source contact. There was no requirement for the [REDACTED] of these meetings and there was no requirement for AOR's. In fact the AOR developed over time. It definitely was not appropriate for the management of 3838 as the major focus of the document initially was to try and stop sources committing crime during their activities on behalf of police.

This policy was designed by <sup>Sandy White-O</sup> and Owen (Det. S/Sgt OWEN then at the HSMU) and the SDU contact reports were the most detailed and accurate in the organisation. Whilst there was room for improvement, Comrie's criticisms are particularly unfair considering the criticism were never put to the members involved.

There are so many criticisms of the actions of the SDU which had they been put to the members could have been answered. Without doubt the contention that the SDU team tasked the source against her clients and even sought defence strategies for the benefit of prosecutions is absolutely false and would have been addressed by the SDU if given the chance.

There is no doubt that some of Comrie's recommendations are valid and there was room for improvement in the documentary practices of the SDU (and indeed right across the organisation).

It should be borne in mind that much of what Comrie has recommended relies heavily on sufficient resources to do it. The SDU never had such resources and struggled to keep up with the accountability processes at times.

It is unclear whether Comrie ever sighted the SML prepared by the SDU controllers (mostly <sup>Sandy White-O</sup> This SML was a complete summary of the management of the source and was used to brief other controllers who relieved <sup>Sandy White-O</sup> during times of leave, etc. SHERIDAN definitely had this document. This document is very important and must be located.