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Thought prompts for discussions with Tony Biggin.

- 1. Spread of functional management responsibilities in Sept 2005 re SDU was it too broad? (and situation now)
- 2. Risk assessment processes – adequacy for those who may owe other duties. R/A utilised in full in late 05 and again in early 06. Not apparently exercised in full subsequently until it was proposed that HS become a witness. What transpired were risks of health / mental health / talk of suicide / comments suggesting compensation is in order / death threats / suspected by criminals / other police? Monthly reporting briefly touched on but no full R/A provided for? Given the changed circumstances should this drive a fresh (full) R/A process?
- 3. Thoughts as to the workability of getting professional; assessments (ie Psychs / legal advice as to the parameters of usage etc) prior to taking on sources and then feeding such info into R/A processes. Was this contemplated (in terms of legal advice prior?)
- 4. With the psych engagements that were arranged – Did SDU get and consider information from to feed into risk assessment processes? had some meetings with HS and could have made some clinical assessment that may have assisted handlers to feed into risk assessment processes?
- 5. Processes for monitoring source usage / Handler – Source interaction / issues arising. By virtue of level of activity is this more a reliance on handlers / controllers briefing on what are identified as critical issues?
- Decisions re issues parked for fear of compromise of source? (ie 6. information not to be divulged for fear of compromise) Can this be revisited and released later?
- 7. Reports of corruption / criminality of mopf. Process to ensure all is passed on? Seems that some was parked for fear of compromise
- 8. AOR's utilised with 3838?
- 9. Interpose – ICRs / Source management logs / IR compilation and lodgement - system suitability / accountability and friendliness to management (does it alert you in a timely way to matters outstanding?).
- Some handlers seem more prompt in lodgement and provide more 10. insightful commentary than others How is handler performance managed? (although in this case it was probably more a matter of handler welfare!).
- 11. Once when source was discharged from hospital and on doctors orders to rest up for the next 5 days - (heart surgery) we tasked her later on the day

- of discharge to find out certain information we sought. How do we / can we monitor appropriate usage of source from a management perspective?
- 12. Clear how demanding that 3838 became Note some reflection about how to manage such a source see (5/5/08 page 125). In hindsight was this (some form of management plan) necessary earlier?
- 13. How To what extent are SCRs monitored? Who does this? As an example see ICR 50 where the source critiques a brief of evidence which extends well beyond the original intent that she look at this to be afforded assurance that it will not compromise her. (is this appropriate anyway?)
- 14. Seems that ICRS's are distilled from taped conversations? To this regard there is great trust in handlers that they will accurately synthesise issues from the conversations to the ICR. Is there ever opportunity to reconcile these records or would it be too time consuming? Many comments seem to be shortened to the point of being meaningless. (ie discussion about welfare) should this be / could this be /how could this be better monitored?
- 15. How do other jurisdictions manage interactions with informers? Is there a better way?
- 16. Do you feel that your concerns (as to HS transitioning to witness) were given a balanced regard?
- 17. Was there a consensus of opinion b/w investigators and handlers/controllers at a time when both were talking to HS?. Some comments in file suggest that Handlers are advising HS not to be overly forthcoming with information to investigators.(see page 109 @ICR 006 "SDU suggest that HS cease suggesting to Petra ideas that may help..."