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The following examples illustrate managerial concern over the resistance from SDU personnel in day to day source handling;

(presumably these are all points raised by O'CONNOR to SHERIDAN that the SDU staff had no opportunity to refute)

- i. *Local Source Registrar (LSR) assessed that the CHIS was not suited to be deployed into the OMCG environment and due to mental instability may self declare under pressure which would precipitate significant risk of harm.*

I don't know which source he is referring to, but in any event the staff were trained to ask questions and debate decisions with each other and management. This was a workplace staffed by very experienced investigators who held the rank of [REDACTED]. Their opinions mattered.

- ii. *Detective Inspector SDU and LSR assessment that CHIS was not a fit and proper person to be deployed by **investigators**.*

Irrelevant to the SDU as they have no control over what investigators believe or do.

- iii. *CHIS had been identified through other intelligence sources to be actively involved in planning a reprisal attack following the [REDACTED]. SDU personnel did not accept the risk assessment of management and argued to continue deployment in the face of strong evidence that deployment would/could be used by source as a likely defence if apprehended committing serious criminal offences against the person. Source has [REDACTED]*

This shows the inexperience of O'CONNOR in human source operations. Steps would have been taken to ensure the source was arrested if he committed that particular crime. SDU staff had participated in arranging a source's arrest in the past. Not only is it the only thing to do it is also a [REDACTED]. Once the source was arrested, he would be reassessed as to his ongoing value vs risk. A source who has been [REDACTED] is then more [REDACTED] if the SDU assessed him as still viable.

- iv. *Staff had to be directed not to pursue recruitment of a high level organised crime figure due to corruption links and his involvement in a current Supreme Court trial.*

That's what officers do, make directions. This doesn't suggest the direction wasn't followed. In any event, his access to corrupt persons would have made that individual a high value source. His involvement in a trial might have been relevant to the corruption links, because it wasn't pursued, who would know.

It is worth noting that SHERIDAN and O'CONNOR were very risk averse. Examples include refusing to allow a human source to [REDACTED] [REDACTED] is necessary to determine [REDACTED] which is a necessary process

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when considering a [REDACTED] operation. This example was not an SDU sample, it was a regional example. It was well known through the organisation that it was very hard to get a source operation approved by SHERIDAN.

O'CONNOR once ran a source who [REDACTED] meeting a target. I think this made him extra risk averse to source operations. Paul SHERIDAN was a very good traditional 'reactive' investigator but I don't believe he ever worked as a 'proactive' investigator and as a result had little appreciation for real world covert strategy, seeing instead only risk.

Interestingly [REDACTED] made a comment in about 2010 saying that law enforcement [REDACTED] had tried to minimise risk in covert operations but eliminating the risk entirely by not authorising covert strategy. They said this was a mistake and that law enforcement had the responsibility of taking on risk on behalf of the communities they protect. It was necessary for law enforcement officers to try to mitigate risk rather than eliminate it by not doing the job the community expects.

vi. Staff confused with misguided loyalty to source, had to be directed not to pursue notification of CHIS of pending raids.

I just can't believe this and doubt very much that a source would be told about impending raids. Would need to know more.

Peer selection

I have addressed this in my statement. I was personal friends with only two of the members selected for the SDU whilst I was a [REDACTED] there. There was a staff of [REDACTED] for most of the time.

The selection process was primarily based on how the applicant performed at the [REDACTED] [REDACTED] human source course which was a very demanding assessment based course, designed primarily to identify and train personnel to work in the high risk handling/recruiting environment.

The only peer selection that occurred was the one where O'CONNOR selected [REDACTED] [REDACTED] to perform the role of [REDACTED] after [REDACTED] went to Briars. O'CONNOR and [REDACTED] had a long close relationship. The had not attended any [REDACTED] source training prior to arriving at the SDU.

Controller rank becoming too involved in source strategy rather than handling.

Whilst the respective controllers in the office have to the best of their ability sought to do this they appear too focused upon personal relationships and the protection of their professional ego in the face of supervisory or managerial challenge.

Protection of their professional ego in the face of supervisory or managerial challenge?
What is the evidence? The source team members were proven change agents, regularly

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selling the concepts of enhanced source management in all [REDACTED] training, even to recruit and detective courses. They were constantly providing advice over the phone and personally to members outside the unit who needed it.

This statement appears to be based on the fact that O'CONNOR felt threatened by the experience of the staff. He was abusive calling one handler a 'fucking cunt' on more than one occasion. He reduced the female staff to tears on more than occasion and he rang me on several occasions on days off or leave to abuse me. I think these incidents suggest O'CONNOR was the one most concerned about his professional ego.

Stress upon individuals undertaking CHIS handling

Inexplicably this (maximum time in position) was not pursued upon unit formation, no reasons have been found to explain the decision, it is speculated that the project team discarded their own proposal based upon self interest. It has become clear that a number of personnel see their positions as "holding life tenure"

I recommended a maximum period of tenure for the members of the unit at 5 years, consisting of one 3 year term that could be extended by one year for two occasions. The Inspector managing the position descriptions, which may have been Doug Cowlshaw, is the one responsible for not having MTIP included in the position descriptions.

During the MTIP issue which A/C POPE was attempting to inflict on all members of the Covert Support Services area, the undercover unit fought the issue strongly and included the Union in the fight. We at the SDU were mute on the topic as we actually believed it was a good thing.

As to the allegation of 'holding life tenure', what a joke. No one would want to hold such a demanding and challenging position for life. The work hours were extreme and interruptions to personal lifestyle constant. On one occasion, a handler showed me a picture his daughter had drawn which showed him on the phone standing beside her crying. This was not a workplace people would remain at forever.

The disruption allowance was introduced as financial compensation for this. The financial incentive to remain in position has become a blocker to staff turnover particularly for personnel who are within retirement age.

Part of the reason POPE wanted to close the unit was so that he could save money. The disruption allowance occurred after many years of members in the covert area pushing to get some compensation for the impact of after hours work on their lives. By closing the SDU POPE no longer had to pay the disruption allowance to [REDACTED] members.

More importantly the suggestion that the financial incentive was a blocker for people who are within retirement age is non sensical. The disruption allowance was super annuable, so it made sense to retire whilst you were receiving the allowance. It probably was a disincentive for members who were not of retirement age to leave the SDU, as they would have lost the allowance by leaving.

It is apparent that the SDU is highly resistant to managerial intervention. This presents as a significant blocker to ensuring compliance with Force policy and hence managing the risk.

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I have addressed this in my statement but take it further. SHERIDAN only ever sought information from his Inspector, being OCONNOR. In two years, I think I met with him on three occasions. O'CONNOR was rarely at the SDU in the time he was there as the manager. He has very sick child, and the staff at the SDU supported him as much as possible by making allowances the fact he was rarely there.

O'CONNOR resisted any input from very experienced staff, somehow seeing them as a threat to his authority. I have never worked in a location where the input of a [REDACTED] [REDACTED] was completely ignored. I found this particularly frustrating as I had created a lot of policy and process to create the SDU some of which O'CONNOR ignored.

Finally, just like the COMRIE review, none of the SDU staff, myself were ever made aware of these criticisms and have not had the opportunity to answer them.