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**Royal Commission  
into the Management of Police Informants**

**STATEMENT OF GLENN MATTHEW OWEN**

1. My full name is Glenn Matthew Owen. I am a Superintendent of Victoria Police
2. I make this statement in response to a request from the Royal Commission into the Management of Police Informants dated 14 August 2019. This statement is produced to the Royal Commission in response to a Notice to Produce.

**Educational background and employment history (question 1)**

3. I graduated from the Police Academy in 1990. I have held the following roles and ranks:
  - a. Between August 1990 and August 1992 I was a Constable at City West Police Station.
  - b. Between August 1992 and August 1993, I was Constable at the Transit Police.
  - c. Between August 1993 and May 1998, I was stationed at Prahran Police Station. I was promoted to Senior Constable in 1997.
  - d. Between May 1998 and May 2001, I was a Detective Senior Constable at the Crime Department. I worked at the Stolen Motor Vehicle Squad and the Organised Crime Squad.
  - e. Between May 2001 and November 2001, I was a Detective Senior Constable at Cranbourne CIU.
  - f. In November 2001, I was promoted to Sergeant. Between November 2001 and November 2002, I was stationed at Frankston Police Station.
  - g. Between November 2002 and May 2005, I was a Detective Sergeant at the Informer Management Unit.
  - h. In 2005, I was promoted to Senior Sergeant. Between May 2005 and December 2007, I was the Joint Intelligence Group Coordinator;

- i. Between December 2007 and September 2009, I was stationed at the Human Source Management Unit as Detective Senior Sergeant. I was the Officer in Charge.
  - j. In September 2009 I was promoted to Inspector. Between September 2009 and April 2013, I was Inspector of Western Region Intelligence.
  - k. Between April 2013 and June 2015, I was Inspector at the Critical Incident Response Team.
  - l. Between June 2015 and December 2018, I was Inspector – Special Operations Group.
  - m. In December 2018, I was promoted to Superintendent. Since then, I have been Superintendent at Western Region Division 2. I still hold this position.
4. I have undertaken the following training:
- a. 1996 – Field Investigators Course
  - b. 1998 – Detective Training School
  - c. 2001 – Intelligence Practitioners Course
  - d. 2001-2005 – Human Source Management Course [REDACTED]
  - e. 2002 – Investigation Management Course (Advanced DTS)
  - f. 2003- Field Intelligence Course (AFP – Human Source)
  - g. 2005 – Specialised National Investigators Course (RCMP)
  - h. 2009 – Police Management Development Program
  - i. 2013 – Police Executive Leadership Program
  - j. 2015 – Senior Managers Leadership Development Program
  - k. 2016 – ANZCTC Tactical Commander’s Course
5. I possess the following qualifications:
- a. 2008 – Certificate IV in Workplace Training and Assessment
  - b. 2010 – Graduate Certificate in Applied Management
  - c. 2016 – Winston Churchill Fellowship
6. I am currently completing a Graduate Diploma in Executive Management.
7. I have received the following awards and commendations:

- a. National Police Service Medal (25 years in 2017)
- b. Police Service Medal (25 years in 2017)
- c. National Medal (2017)

**Involvement or association with any investigation which had dealings with Nicola Gobbo (question 2)**

8. I had no role in any investigation which had dealings with Ms Gobbo. However, on 1 April 2004, when I was a Detective Sergeant at the Informer Management Unit, I received information from another law enforcement agency about a registered source who may have had information or intelligence with respect to Carl Williams. My diary notes that Ms Gobbo was Carl Williams' solicitor. I referred the contact to the Purana Taskforce.

**Use of Ms Gobbo as a human source (questions 3-8)**

Question 3

9. To the best of my recollection, I learned that Ms Gobbo was providing information or assistance to Victoria Police sometime in 2007. It is my recollection that I learned that Ms Gobbo was providing information or assistance while I was upgraded to the Officer in Charge of the Human Source Management Unit, or shortly before I took that position permanently.
10. My recollection is that I had a conversation with Sandy White in which he briefed me about matters relating to the DSU generally. During the conversation, Sandy White told me that Ms Gobbo was a human source. He said to me that Ms Gobbo was the highest of high risk human sources and said words to the effect that if I had any requests in relation to Ms Gobbo or informer 3838, then I needed to apply the highest level of confidentiality.
11. I knew that Ms Gobbo was a legal practitioner because she had a high profile in the media and within Victoria Police. The specific risks to Ms Gobbo that were the subject of discussion by Sandy White and me were in the context of her being a lawyer acting for clients involved in the gangland war. The risks to Ms Gobbo's safety were obvious to me.
12. Sandy White and I did not have a conversation like this with regard to every human source. The HSMU played no role in conducting risk assessments of DSU sources. It went without saying that all human sources managed by the DSU were high risk and anonymity was important. However, I considered it appropriate at the time (and still do) that Sandy White

informed me of Ms Gobbo's status, given the serious risks to Ms Gobbo's safety that existed at the time.

13. The HSMU and DSU worked together closely but performed different roles. The HSMU was responsible for maintaining the central database of all informer files and for ensuring compliance with the Human Source Management Policy. It maintained governance responsibility for all sources, including those sources under management by the DSU. However, the actual management of high risk sources was conducted by the DSU.
14. For example, the Human Source Management Policy at the time required that the controller and the Local Informer Registrar conduct periodic reviews of all active registrations. The HSMU was responsible for prompting the controller and LIR to conduct those reviews, however, the responsibility for actually conducting those reviews was with the DSU. Similarly, if a registered human source appeared to be inactive, then the HSMU would prompt the controller to consider whether the source should be deactivated. However, it was the DSU, not the HSMU that would decide whether the source should be deactivated or not.
15. As Officer in Charge of the HSMU, I would have frequent discussions with Sandy White (and other controllers and handlers within the DSU) about administrative matters such as applications for registration of human sources, application for assistance, follow up queries on contact reports, amongst other things. These discussions related to all sources being managed by the DSU. From time to time, Informer 3838 was mentioned. I do not recall the specifics of these discussions, save than to say that they were of an administrative nature.
16. In my discussions with Sandy White and others within the DSU, Ms Gobbo was always referred to as Informer 3838. A strict process had been put in place whereby all sources were referred to by their informer number and Ms Gobbo was no exception.
17. Save than for my initial conversation with Sandy White, I did not receive any updates or briefings from the DSU about Nicola Gobbo related issues. I was not briefed on intelligence that she had provided, or on risk assessments or other issues in relation to Ms Gobbo.
18. At around the time Ms Gobbo was to be deactivated, I had another conversation with Sandy White. Sandy White said to me that there had been a direction that Ms Gobbo was to provide a statement and that from that point on, Ms Gobbo would be managed as a witness

by the Crime Department, not as a covert source by the SDU. My recollection of the conversation is that Sandy White was concerned about this decision. He told me that he disagreed with it and was concerned that her status as a human source would become known.

19. During this discussion, Sandy White said that there had been a number of discussions about the management of Ms Gobbo between the SDU, Crime Department and other areas of Victoria Police, such as the [REDACTED] I was not involved in any of those discussions.
20. I was not provided with a copy of her statement but it is my recollection that the subject of the investigation was ex-member of Police Paul Dale.

#### Question 4

21. Sandy White was aware that Ms Gobbo was providing information or assistance to Victoria Police, and I believe that the handlers in the DSU, including Officer Black, Officer Peter Smith, Officer Ted Richards, Officer Green, Officer Fox, Officer Wolf, Detective Sergeant Andersen and Officer Avenue were also aware, as it was their practice to operate in a team environment.
22. I understand that Ms Gobbo was introduced to the DSU by members of the Crime Department, although I do not know who those members are or when this occurred. Those members would be aware that Ms Gobbo provided information or assistance to Victoria Police.
23. Ms Gobbo's registration would have been approved and processed by members of the Intelligence and Covert Support Department. I do not know specifically who those members were.

#### Question 5

24. According to the policy that was in place at the time, the Central Source Registrar (who was the Superintendent in Charge of the State Intelligence Division) was the officer responsible for the authorisation of all human sources according to policy. I do not know the individual who occupied that role at the time Ms Gobbo was registered. I am otherwise unaware of who authorised (or was responsible for the continued authorisation) of Ms Gobbo as a human source.

Question 6

25. I have had no personal contact with Ms Gobbo.

Question 7

26. While the HSMU stored information received from all sources, including Ms Gobbo, I have no recollection as to specifics of any of that information.

27. At the time I was Officer in Charge of the HSMU, the HSMU computers and DSU computers were 'air gapped', which means that they were not connected to a computer network. The DSU handlers and controllers would complete informer contact reports on their own computer system and from time to time, would deliver information to the HSMU so that it could be loaded to the HSMU source database under the specific informer files.

28. Because they were stored on "air gap" networks, it was necessary for the informer contact reports to be physically taken from the DSU to the HSMU. These documents were always delivered in soft copy and were transferred by way of a special kind of USB drive, which was encrypted by password. No hard copy informer contact reports were ever delivered to the HSMU. All records were held electronically.

29. Over time, the DSU developed a practice of submitting what they described as multi contact reports. To the best of my recollection, multi-contact reports were preferred by the DSU because of the frequency of contact with some informers, including Ms Gobbo. Preparing multi-contact reports eased the administrative burden of preparing multiple contact reports in a short space of time.

30. The HSMU did not [REDACTED] of [REDACTED]. To my knowledge, such documents were maintained in the records of the DSU.

31. The only time that I would access the intelligence holdings would be in response to a request for assistance from investigators throughout Victoria Police. On receipt of such a request, the Human Source Management Unit would search the informer management database for information relevant to the request. If relevant information was identified, then the HSMU would contact the handling team and a decision would be made as to what (if any) information was provided back to the investigator.

Question 8

32. I am not aware of any assistance provided to Victoria Police by Ms Gobbo.

**Concerns in relation to the use of Ms Gobbo as a human source**Question 9

33. I am not aware of any concerns being raised at any time as to the use of a legal practitioner as a human source.

Question 10

34. My recollection is that when briefing me in relation to the fact that Ms Gobbo was a high risk source, Sandy White raised concerns with me in relation to her safety. He said to me words to the effect that he was concerned if her identity as a human source became known, her life would be in danger. I agreed with Sandy White's assessment.

35. I also recall having discussions with Sandy White about the fact that Ms Gobbo was a legal practitioner. He said to me that he was conscious about the risk surrounding her providing information about her current clients. I recall him telling me that he had spoken to her about this issue.

36. Save than for these matters, I am not aware of any concerns being raised as to the use of Ms Gobbo as a human source.

Question 11

37. I have no knowledge of these matters.

**Other relevant matters**Question 12

38. I am not aware of any other human source who provided information or assistance to Victoria Police who was subject to legal obligations of confidentiality or privilege.

Question 13

39. In November 2002, I accepted a role as a Sergeant in the Informer Management Unit. In this role, I was tasked with preparing a proposal for the implementation of dedicated informer management. My proposal led to the establishment of a Dedicated Source Management Handling Project Team, of which I was the Deputy Team Leader.

40. In May 2004, the Dedicated Source Handling Team finalised a report that recommended, amongst other things, the establishment of a specialised source handling unit for the recruitment and management of high risk sources.<sup>1</sup>
41. Shortly after the Report was completed, it was agreed that a six month pilot of dedicated human source management would be established and a steering committee was set up to manage the pilot. While I was not a member of the Steering Committee, I attended a number of meetings in the secretariat position. I have been shown the agenda and minutes of meetings that record my attendance.<sup>2</sup> I do not recall these meetings but have no reason to think that I did not attend them or that the minutes are not an accurate record of what was discussed.
42. To the best of my recollection, the Pilot took around six months to set up and commenced toward the end of 2014.
43. In January 2005, I prepared an Issue Cover Sheet recommending that approval and expenditure be granted for two members of Victoria Police to travel to Canada in June 2005 to develop human source training.<sup>3</sup> Canada was chosen because the Royal Canadian Mounted Police had been identified as having a leading human source management training structure, [REDACTED]. To the best of my recollection, the Steering Committee had decided that [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]
44. In May 2005, I travelled to Canada with Sandy White to attend [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]
45. When I returned to Australia, I was promoted to Senior Sergeant as Joint Intelligence Group Coordinator. In spite of the transfer, I continued working with Sandy White to develop the training and the concept of a dedicated source unit.

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<sup>1</sup> VPL.0100.0048.0833.


<sup>2</sup> VPL.0100.0048.0676, VPL.0100.0048.1073, VPL.0100.0048.1075, VPL.0100.0048.1076, VPL.0100.0048.1082, VPL.0100.0048.1087, VPL.0100.0048.1093, VPL.0100.0048.1094, VPL.0100.0048.1096, VPL.0100.0048.1097, VPL.0100.0048.1101, VPL.0100.0048.1104, VPL.0100.0048.1110, VPL.0100.0048.1115, VPL.0100.0048.1119, VPL.0100.0048.1123, VPL.0100.0048.1127, VPL.0100.0048.1131, VPL.0100.0048.1136, VPL.0100.0048.1140, VPL.0100.0048.1143, VPL.0100.0048.1148, VPL.0100.0048.1277

<sup>3</sup> VPL.0100.0056.1015



46. In the period from 2005 to 2009, I recall delivering human source management training on a numerous occasions. I ceased to have any role with human source management when I left the Human Source Management Unit in 2009.

Dated: 13 November 2019

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Glenn Owen', written over a horizontal dotted line.

Glenn Owen