

**Recommendation 1.**

That the term ‘Human Source’ is adopted by both the Informer Management Unit (IMU) and Dedicated Source Unit (DSU).

**Decision:****Date:** / / 2005**Recommendation 2.**

That the Informer Management Unit is renamed the Human Source Management Unit (HSMU).

**Decision:****Date:** / / 2005**Staffing**

This section incorporates DSHT project recommendations:-

- 1.6 - Detective Inspector DSU
- 1.8 - Detective Inspector IMU
- 6.3 - Controllers x [REDACTED] and Handlers x [REDACTED]
- 6.4 - Analysts x [REDACTED] DSU
- 6.5 - Analysts x [REDACTED] IMU
- 7.5 – 3 stage DSU implementation.

\* Recommendations 1.8 and 6.5 do not relate to the DSU evaluation and are not reported on

The Evaluation Team examined current and anticipated workloads of the DSU, taking into consideration the number of Human Sources (HS) being managed, as well as the additional responsibilities of the unit. At the time of writing (4th April 2005) the DSU were managing [REDACTED] HS with a further [REDACTED] having been recently de-registered.

Contact with the source varies due to the amount of activity occurring at any point in time, as well as the differing types of HS. It is therefore not possible to determine a finite number of HS that a handler can be allocated. This is an operational decision made by the Controller based on his/her judgement and expertise. However, in broad terms the number of HS that can be effectively managed by a single handler is between [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. In addition to their primary handler role, Handlers also have Co-handler responsibility for a number of HS.

As at the 5th April 2005 the activities undertaken by the DSU were as follows:-

- [REDACTED] x high risk sources being actively managed
- [REDACTED] x requests for assistance had been received
- [REDACTED] x Contact Reports had been prepared
- [REDACTED] x Information Reports had been disseminated

The Evaluation Team support the view expressed by DSU management and staff, that DSU is currently close to capacity and that taking on many additional high risk HS could lead to their effective management being put at risk, thus defeating the primary objective of forming a DSU in the first instance. The Evaluation Team believes that the number of HS ([REDACTED]) currently

being managed by the DSU only represents a small percentage of the potential number of ‘High Risk’ sources that exist (see ‘Member Confidence’ page 12).

As confidence in the DSU increases the number of high risk HS transferred for DSU management will similarly increase. The need for this unit to be appropriately staffed in order to meet the anticipated service demand has been examined by the Evaluation Team.

As a result of initial stakeholder consultations, as previously stated the Evaluation Team formed the opinion that, the DSU should become permanent and in line with the three staged staffing proposal (Recommendation 7.5), there was an immediate need for implementation of Stages 1 and 2, effectively doubling the piloted staff and adding the additional position of Inspector in charge DSU.

Support for the aforementioned staffing position was expressed to a DSU Steering Committee on the 18th March 2005. The Evaluation Team further recommended that a business case be submitted as a matter of priority to seek approval for DSU permanency and advertising of the piloted and additional positions. The urgency was thought necessary due to the pilot program ending on the 30th April 2005 with seconded staff being requested back to their respective workplaces.

The DSU Steering Committee subsequently made a request for the CMRD Evaluation Team to outline the reasons for their support at a Policing Operations Standing Committee (POSC) meeting held on Wednesday, 6th April 2005. Inspector Townsend addressed this meeting and provided information in support of the continuance of the DSU as previously outlined. POSC, while recommending the continuance of the DSU, were of the view that a business case should be prepared, with any additional staffing sought to follow normal Victoria Police processes.

The DSU Steering Committee also sought support for a recommendation to be placed before POSC that:-

*“The POSC approve ‘in principle’ progression towards establishment of a permanent Dedicated Source Unit in accordance with endorsed recommendations 7.5 and 7.6 Dedicated Source Handling Team Project”.*

While the Evaluation Team supported the DHST staffing (Recommendation 7.5) relating to the implementation of Stages 1 and 2, it believed that a move to implement Stage 3 (Controller, 4 Handlers and 1 Analyst) had not been demonstrated. Full implementation of the three stages would provide the DSU with a total staff of 1 x Inspector, [REDACTED] x [REDACTED] (Controllers), [REDACTED] x [REDACTED] (Handlers) and [REDACTED] x Analysts.

Although it is likely that this level of staffing would eventually be justified, the Evaluation Team cannot assess the level of staffing beyond Stage 2. Therefore while the need for additional staffing to Stage 2 (doubling) is warranted, any further increase in line with the Stage 3 needs to be demonstrated over time.

The following reasons were outlined to the DSU Steering Committee and subsequent POSC meetings in support of the increase in DSU staff and permanency (DSU Project Recommendation 7.5, Stages 1 and 2) :-

- There is a great potential and likelihood that other sources will be identified for DSU management. Currently [REDACTED] High Risk Sources (+ [REDACTED] deregistered) are being managed by the DSU with only [REDACTED] coming from the Regions. The potential for high risk sources to be located within regions and currently being inefficiently managed is high. As reported in the IMU evaluation, in April 2004 after the introduction of the IMU policy, registered informers fell from approximately [REDACTED] to [REDACTED]. While the significant variance between the old and the new can in part be attributed to not previously having an effective deregistration system in place, there was clearly a strong reluctance to register informers with the IMU demonstrated by members.
- A maximum of [REDACTED] sources per handler can be managed especially when handlers also have co-handler responsibilities and taking into consideration leave and other job commitments (see next dot point).
- Additional areas for development are:-
  - Participate in delivering [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] training
  - Develop and participate in delivering [REDACTED] training
  - Encourage Regions to adopt DSU system
  - Implement any [REDACTED] strategies
  - Staff leave and Course considerations.
- If current staff levels are not increased there is the risk that additional sources identified as 'High Risk' will not be managed appropriately due to staff availability, resulting in high risk sources not being taken on, or heightening the bar so fewer people meet the high risk criteria. The commitment of resources that is required when managing a high risk HS was further supported by comments made by handlers who have passed their HS management onto the DSU (see next dot point).
- Without exception handlers reported that a significant amount of time, in some cases up to half of available duty time, is taken up with HS management. The DSU handlers have removed this management responsibility from the divisions/squads with respect to high risk sources and are available [REDACTED] to respond to the source and devote the time necessary to manage them appropriately.
- The risk is transferred away from operational members and reduces the risk to Victoria Police due to poor or mismanagement by introducing a sterile corridor. The following two examples given by members who have passed over their sources to the DSU support this:-
  - A source with a history of making serious complaints against police presented a high risk to a handler due to the sources' knowledge and previous abuse of the informer system. The member was relieved when the DSU took over the management of the source.
  - A source being handled by a regional RRU member saw information provided go from local to a 'Purana' level. He felt out of his depth and was relieved when contacted by the DSU, which led to the management of the source being transferred.

- When a Handler is upgraded to [REDACTED] (Controller), he/she will be performing the Controller role for a source they have previously managed as a handler. This presents a risk to the independence of the Controller's role, avoided during pilot by Project Officer, Glen Owen being upgraded. Given the nature of the DSU work it would be inappropriate for a person from another area to perform relieving duties as the Controller in the DSU.
- The current DSU inspector is performing two roles within the Intelligence and Covert Support Department. Management is assisted by the Controller performing some of the inspector's responsibilities with advice being provided by the Steering Committee, Commander Moloney, Superintendent Biggin and others. However, once permanent and with additional staff, the reliance on various managers to assist in DSU management will need to fall to an individual. This together with the Controller being allowed to concentrate on his/her core duties necessitates the need for an Inspector to be above all aspects of the running of the DSU.
- Most handlers were sceptical about handing over their HS at first, believing that the information they were previously receiving would no longer be available to them. In practice the DSU provided regular feedback ensuring that any relevant information went to the original handler for investigation.
- Previously intelligence obtained was focussed on the investigator's specific matters with other information largely ignored. All information received by DSU is disseminated to the relevant area for investigation.
- Uniformity in handling high risk sources is assured and assisted by appropriately trained dedicated staff.
- In no short measure the credibility of the staff selected for the DSU pilot is a contributory factor to its success to date.

### Member Confidence

While the Evaluation Team believes that the number of HS [REDACTED] currently being managed by the DSU is near capacity, this only represents a small percentage of the potential number of 'High Risk' sources believed to exist within Victoria Police. While difficult to quantify, the Evaluation Team evidence their position from knowledge gained during discussions with regional handlers and controllers during the Informer Management Unit (IMU) Controller File audit, where several members openly stated they would continue to manage informers outside of the IMU policy, see Informer Management Unit audit report *Audit Findings – Generic*, sub-heading *Policy – Member Acceptance*, pages 9 – 10 (RMU file 037408/04).

The Evaluation Team's view is further supported, as previously stated, by the fact that regions only have [REDACTED] HS being managed by the DSU. Further, when speaking to regional handlers that have transferred their HS to the DSU it was indicated that, as with the IMU policy, they believed many members were reluctant to register HS or identify them as 'High Risk' for fear of losing information that would otherwise have assisted them in their work or themselves, for example, assistance to get into the CIU. For those that have handed over their source to the DSU the experience has been contrary to that perceived, as they receive regular updates and most importantly any information that relates to their work location.

There is evidence that across the Force operational members of differing ranks are confused with the roles and responsibilities of the IMU and the DSU, believing in some instances that they are the same. The resistance to change in registering informers is being translated to the DSU whose charter is to manage high risk sources not their registration. Given that the roles are clearly different, this lack of knowledge is hindering the acceptance of the DSU and potential sources to be managed and needs to be proactively redressed.

***Recommendation 3.***

That the Dedicated Source Unit (DSU) and Informer Management Unit (IMU) develop and implement a strategy to ensure members are fully conversant with the roles and responsibilities of each of the areas.

**Decision:**

**Date:** / / 2005

**DSU Risk Assessment**

During the evaluation stage prior to the recruitment of any source by the DSU, a full and concise risk assessment is conducted, which is based on the current Australian, New Zealand Risk Management Standard. This assessment aids the decision making process as to whether the source should or should not be managed by the DSU (Appendix D).

The DSU Risk Assessment model was provided to Mr Tim Mason, the Force's Risk Manager for comment. He has provided advice to the DSU on two minor areas that help the model to better comply with the current Australian, New Zealand Risk Management Standard. Ongoing interaction between DSU and the Risk Manager has resulted in the development of a specific risk management data base being developed for DSU use.

The application of risk assessment being applied to source management the across the Force, excluding those managed by the DSU varies. This variance and its effectiveness can be directly related to the knowledge and or experience of the individual members. The comprehensive risk assessment developed by the DSU is currently being trialled within the Major Drug Investigation Division (MDID) with a view to implementing it across the Force in the future. Members who have completed the assessment to date indicate that while time consuming, it clearly assists them in identifying the correct level of risk.

The Evaluation Team fully supports the implementation of this procedure as a priority, as it will provide consistency across the Force. A planned member education strategy will facilitate consistency of application and assist in reducing risks associated with source management at all risk levels.

***Recommendation 4.***

That an implementation strategy be developed to introduce the Dedicated Source Unit (DSU) risk assessment across the Force.

**Decision:**

**Date:** / / 2005

### Training – [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]

The Evaluation Team are aware of the current [REDACTED] training that is being conducted, with input from the DSU. Feedback from members who have attended that training is very supportive.

It is understood that [REDACTED] <sup>Sandy White-O</sup> and Detective Sergeant Owen, both of the DSU, will be attending a [REDACTED] training course, facilitated by the [REDACTED]. It is intended that on their return, in conjunction with IMU, they will develop and implement the [REDACTED] training, initially for members of the DSU.

Given that this will be the only [REDACTED] course available in Australia, Victoria Police will be uniquely positioned to offer [REDACTED] training to any other law enforcement agencies in Australasia.

The Evaluation Team strongly supports these efforts.

### Organisational Alignment

For the duration of the pilot the DSU were located within the State Intelligence Division (SID), Intelligence and Covert Support (ICS), under Intelligence Operations. While the DSU is correctly positioned within ICS, stakeholder interviews revealed that opinions differed as to whether the DSU should be located under the SID or Covert Support Division (CSD).

Reasons for placing the DSU under CSD were that the DSU is considered to be an operational unit and should be accommodated with the other intelligence gathering operational units. Further, during the pilot the DSU were successful at being reactive to members needs by providing real time intelligence to assist current operations, which is consistent with the nature of other covert support units.

There is a belief within the regions that as CSD is very rarely available to the regions that it is a service only available to the Crime Department. At a time when the DSU is still in its infancy any perception that the DSU is a Crime Department resource will potentially hinder the effectiveness of the DSU. To increase the number of high risk HS being identified and passed to the DSU for management within the regions, currently two, the DSU needs to be demonstrate their availability to the regions without any perceived bias.

Acting Commander Thomas, ICS believes that the DSU should remain within SID along with other intelligence gathering units. This view is consistent with a 1999 Metropolitan Police, England commissioned report titled “Evaluation of Dedicated Source Units”. In it, the consultants looked at nine DSU’s within the Metropolitan Police and a number of constabularies within England. The evaluation found that<sup>2</sup> “The most common configuration for the DSU was an independent element within the Divisional Intelligence Unit. . . .”

As previously stated, it was identified during discussions with regional members that there is still confusion over the roles of the DSU and the IMU, some members believing that the DSU are part of the IMU. Further, that if you register a source, the DSU will take it from you. If the DSU are to remain under the SID, clarification through member education is required.

<sup>2</sup> Evaluation of Dedicated Source Units, CIS Consultancy Group, 1999, Pg 5.

The Evaluation Team can see benefits in both models, however continued placement in the intelligence stream is not only in line with practices employed overseas but also assists the maintenance of confidentiality by having intelligence gathered, kept and disseminated by a single division.

The Evaluation Team concluded that the retention of the DSU within the SID is the most suitable option for the management of any intelligence that is to be retained and is in line with the “Five Year Strategic Plan, The Way Ahead.”

***Recommendation 5.***

That the Dedicated Source Unit is formally placed under the control of the State Intelligence Division, Intelligence and Covert Support.

**Decision:**

**Date:** / / 2004

**LIR/CIR**

The Informer Management Policy, CCI 6/04, nominates the Local Informer Registrar (LIR) as Divisional Superintendents or Superintendents in charge of other areas and the Central Informer Registrar (CIR) being the Detective Superintendent, State Intelligence Division, Intelligence and Covert Support. The CIR is responsible for the management of the IMU process, the position effectively sits above the LIR’s for the purpose of informer management.

As the DSU in line Superintendent is the Force CIR, a situation arises where this position also has the responsibility as the LIR. This anomaly was identified at the commencement of the pilot. The subject of who would be the nominated LIR and CIR for the DSU was subsequently discussed by the DSHT Project Steering Committee. As a result of these discussions it was decided that the LIR would be the Superintendent, State Intelligence Division and the CIR would be the Commander, Intelligence and Covert Support. Given the high level risk that is associated with the management of DSU the Evaluation Team believes this initiative is appropriate.

The nature of work within the DSU means that operatives both operating as handlers or controllers are required to work at an optimal level at all times to minimise risk to themselves, their sources and the Force. While appropriate management and effective policy minimises the risk potential, the Evaluation Team believes that there needs to be a [REDACTED] applied to any DSU appointment.

Excluded from the recommendations evaluated, due to the inability to assess a [REDACTED] over the six month pilot, DSHT project Recommendation 2.6 states:-

*That a [REDACTED] for handler and controller is [REDACTED] subject to annual review. Furthermore that a [REDACTED] must [REDACTED] prior to a further position at previous or superior rank.*

In line with current Victoria Police [REDACTED] (MDID and GLLO) the Evaluation Team recommends that a [REDACTED] with management endorsed options for

a further [REDACTED] be implemented. A [REDACTED] of [REDACTED] would therefore apply to any DSU appointment.

Management should also have the option of moving a staff member if the member is deemed unsuitable or has been exposed to significant risk, assessed as detrimental to themselves or the organisation. Any decisions made to be the subject of senior level management consultation and input.

The Evaluation Team agrees with the DSHT project view that a [REDACTED] must elapse prior to a further period of duty at the DSU at previous or higher rank. To ensure the skill level of the DSU is maintained a strategy to stagger the end date of initial DSU staff will need to be adopted.

Within a reasonable timeframe prior to a member leaving the DSU, the manager DSU must proactively assist the employee to find an alternative position including any familiarisation, training and re-integration deemed necessary.

The specific employment conditions for persons seeking a position within the DSU will need to be explained and endorsed by the applicant as part of the selection process.

The use of [REDACTED] also serves as an anti-corruption measure.

**Recommendation 6.**

That a [REDACTED] of [REDACTED] with the possibility of two manager approved [REDACTED] be implemented for all DSU staff, other than the analyst(s).

**Decision:**

**Date:** / / 2005

**Recommendation 7.**

That any conditions of employment that are specific to the Dedicated Source Unit (DSU) are fully outlined and agreed to by candidates, for all positions, as part of the selection process.

**Decision:**

**Date:** / / 2005

**Recommendation 8.**

That within a reasonable timeframe prior to a member leaving the Dedicated Source Unit (DSU), the manager must proactively assist the employee to find an alternative position including any training, familiarisation and re-integration deemed necessary.

**Decision:**

**Date:** / / 2005

**Recommendation 9.**

To ensure continuity and maintenance of service delivery a staggered approach to the movement of staff out of the Dedicated Source Unit (DSU) be adopted

**Decision:**

**Date:** / / 2005

The Evaluation Team considered the role of the DSU analyst(s) with respect to time in position and concluded that the position was not subject to the same operational rigours and



risks i.e. operational ‘burnout’ that could be experienced by handlers and controllers. It is therefore proposed that any analysts at the DSU be subjected to the same conditions of employment as other DSU members, with the exception of [REDACTED]

It is recommended that in the case of analyst(s) who have completed a [REDACTED] at DSU, they be subjected to an ongoing annual review of their position to determine their ongoing suitability. Therefore effectively providing no end date to their employment within DSU. The reason for this recommendation is that it is in the interests of the organisation to retain the intelligence and experience that analyst(s) acquire over a protracted period. This knowledge is invaluable to the ongoing operations of the DSU and any annual review would take into consideration the benefits of retaining this information for the Force, balanced against any risks associated with the ongoing employment of the analyst(s).

#### **Recommendation 10.**

That a [REDACTED] of [REDACTED] with followed by ongoing manager approved [REDACTED] be implemented for all DSU analyst(s).

**Decision:**

**Date:** / / 2005

#### **Location (Physical)**

It has been stated that<sup>3</sup> “The most important issue concerning location of DSU’s was one of operational autonomy from other co-located units. This was to ensure independence of action and confidentiality of informant information.”

For the duration of the pilot the Steering Committee determined that the DSU would be located within the [REDACTED]<sup>4</sup> instead of [REDACTED]. The Evaluation Team questioned this decision given the security issues arising by requiring DSU staff to come and go from identified [REDACTED]. However, the decision facilitated interaction by DSU with Crime Department members with the intention of generating cultural change with regard to source handling. This interaction was deemed necessary during the pilot.

SID management has recently identified [REDACTED] from which the DSU will operate when a decision is made to formalise the unit’s permanency.

#### **Audit of Dedicated Source Handling Team (DSHT) Recommendations**

As part of the evaluation of the Dedicated Source Unit (DSU), the recommendations emanating from the ‘Dedicated Source Handling Teams Project’ were examined to determine to what extent they had, or had not, been implemented.

These recommendations were agreed to by the Steering Committee prior to the commencement of the DSU pilot.

<sup>3</sup> Evaluation of Dedicated Source Units, CIS Consultancy Group, 1999, Pg 5.

<sup>4</sup> Victoria Police ‘Review and Develop Best Practice Human Source Management Policy’

To assist with the analysis of findings a comparison matrix documenting the criterion as well as findings has been employed. The matrix uses the following colour code for standards achieved.

**It must be stressed that the assessed standard relating to the DSHT recommendations relate specifically to those achieved by the DSU and/or IMU and do not reflect the standards or systems and practices in other Regions or Departments.**

Achieved	Consistently met the required standard
Close to Standard	Marginally below the required standard
Not Yet Achieved	Significantly below the required standard
Unable to assess	Not assessed or unable to determine

### **DSHT Recommendation 1.1**

*That the Informer Management Policy is updated to incorporate the amended interpretation and application of the Acknowledgment of Responsibilities as follows:*

- I. *Where an Informer is to be registered, the terms and conditions surrounding the relationship must be explained, either as they are outlined, or in language that conveys the intentions of the document.*
- II. *Completion of the document is effected by the Controller:*
  - a) *Obtaining the Informer's signature in the area provided; or*
  - b) *\_\_\_\_\_ signing the lower portion of the form noting that such action has been undertaken.*
- III. *Guidelines as to the necessary terms and conditions of the relationship are to be outlined in the Informer Management Policy.*
- IV. *The Central Informer Registrar must be satisfied that this instruction has been complied with.*

### **Close To Standard**

#### **Comment**

Advice of a policy amendment to incorporate these points was circulated in a global e-mail (authorised by Assistant Commissioner Overland) on the 8<sup>th</sup> April 2004. This was supported by an amendment to the Informer Management 'Acknowledgement of Responsibilities' form in use from that date.

This amendment has not yet been reflected in the written policy document. The Informer Management Unit Policy is to be revised incorporating the above amendments.

### **DSHT Recommendation 1.2**

*That the Informer Management Policy is updated to incorporate the amended definition of an Informer as follows:*

*An identified person who provides information of interest to Victoria Police where there exists an expectation that their identity ought be protected; and*

- I. *they actively seek out further intelligence or information on direction or request of police, or*
- II. *information or intelligence is provided in an ongoing relationship (i.e. 3 or more occasions), or*
- III. *they are to receive reward, [REDACTED] or*
- IV. *there presents a threat or potential of danger or harm to an interested party to the relationship, or*
- V. *the Central Informer Registrar determines it necessary in the circumstances.*

**Not Yet Achieved**

#### **Comment**

The Informer Management Unit Policy is to be revised incorporating the above amendments, taking into consideration CMRD's recommendation 1 and 2 at page 9 of this Evaluation.

#### ***DSHT Recommendation 1.3***

*That the Informer Management Policy is updated to incorporate the amended process for authorisation of Informer registration as follows:*

- I. *The Informer Management Unit will assist with the completion of the registration documents, acknowledgment of responsibilities, risk assessment and any recommendations as to control measures.*
- II. *The registration documents are then forwarded to the Local Informer Registrar who signs the forms, thereby accepting registration and nominated control measures.*
- III. *The completed registration forms are then forwarded to the Informer Management Unit for processing, and authorisation by the Central Informer Registrar.*
- IV. *The Informer Management Unit then creates a Central Informer Management File and provides the unique identifier to the handler and controller.*

**Not Yet Achieved**

#### **Comment**

The Informer Management Unit Policy is to be revised incorporating the above amendments.

#### ***DSHT Recommendation 1.4***

*That the Informer Management Policy is updated to incorporate the amended audit and review regime as follows:*

- I. *That the Informer Management Unit produces a monthly report to the Central Informer Registrar.*

- II. *That the report contain details of:*
- *All active Informers for Specialist Operations, Operations and Crime Department by Division.*
  - *A summary of contacts*
  - *Any compliance deficiencies*
  - *Any recommendations*
  - *An assessment as to continued registration.*
- III. *That the Central Informer Registrar provides such monthly report to the relevant Assistant Commissioner for distribution to the designated Local Informer Registrar/s to be actioned.*
- IV. *That the Central Informer Registrar will ensure that all deactivated Informers are properly de-briefed and an assessment conducted as to:*
- *The reasons for deactivation*
  - *Any rewards or reimbursements provided*
  - *The accuracy of information reporting relevant to the Informer.*
- V. *That such audits and assessments will be noted on the Central Informer File.*
- VI. *The Corporate Management Review Division will conduct annual audits of the Central Informer Files.*

#### Not Yet Achieved

#### Comment

The Informer Management Unit Policy is to be revised incorporating the above amendments.

Now that the Informer Management Unit has been in place for over 12 months CMRD need to be tasked to conduct an audit of the Central Informer Files

The Evaluation Team also believe that dot point 1 of recommendation 1.4 (II) is too prescriptive and should be reworded to read :-

- All active Victoria Police Registered Human Sources

#### *DSHT Recommendation 1.5*

*That an independent periodical performance audit of the source management structure is conducted including to review whether resources are sufficient (suggested bi-annual).*

#### Achieved

#### Comment

Initial independent review conducted by way of this evaluation by CMRD. Further periodic reviews and time-frames to be negotiated with Commander CMRD.

#### *DSHT Recommendation 1.6*

*That a Detective Inspector position be created at the State Intelligence Division, whose responsibility will be the Officer in Charge- Dedicated Source Handling Team.*

#### Not Yet Achieved

***Recommendation 11.***

That Ethical Standards Department (ESD) consult with the Informer Management and Dedicated Source Unit's to determine appropriate ESD informer management procedures in line with recognised world 'Best Practice' standards.

**Decision:****Date:** / / 2005**Office of Police Integrity**

While addressing a [REDACTED] Handlers Course on the 1st April 2005 Mr Brian Hardiman, Deputy Director, Office of Police Integrity (OPI) stated that:-

- *“Most high level corruption can be traced back to mismanagement of informers”*
- *“A sterile corridor is strongly recommended”*
- *“Informer Management is one of the most difficult areas to manage”*

To further explore the Deputy Director's opinion and determine how the OPI manages its informers, the Evaluation Team met with Mr Hardiman on the 14th April 2005. Mr Hardiman expressed a desire to ensure that any informers managed by the OPI were managed appropriately. To this end the Evaluation Team facilitated discussions between the OPI, DSU and IMU.

At present there is no formal protocol in place between Victoria Police and the OPI to share information that may come to the notice of either area that would be of benefit to each other. For example, Victoria Police may receive information from a source relative to crime/corruption occurring within a government department, which unknown to Victoria Police, the OPI also have an interest in. A protocol that provides avenues for dialogue between appropriate management levels of both agencies would be of mutual benefit.

***Recommendation 12.***

Dialogue between Victoria Police and the Office of Police Integrity is facilitated to determine protocols for information provided by sources, where relevant, to be shared between those agencies.

**Decision:****Date:** / / 2005**Implementation of Recommendations**

Should any or all of these recommendations be approved for implementation, a bi-monthly status report is to be forwarded to the CMRD Evaluation Team for tabling at the Victoria Police Organisational Assurance Committee (VPOAC) meeting. This status report is to outline the progress (Active/Pending/Closed) of each recommendation. A copy of this template can be seen at Appendix E, and will be made available in an electronic format to the member(s) responsible for implementation.

***Recommendation 13.***

A bi-monthly status report is to be forwarded to the CMRD Evaluation Team outlining the progress (Active/Pending/Closed) of each approved recommendation.

**Decision:****Date:** / / 2005

**Peter Townsend**  
**Inspector**

**David Feather**  
**Inspector**

DRAFT